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INTRODUCTION 
In early 1992, a Guatemalan guerilla named Efrain Bamaca­
Velasquez disappeared during a skirmish with the Guatemalan 
military.1 Although the military claimed that Bamaca had died in the 
battle, his wife, Jennifer Harbury, discovered a year later that her 
husband was indeed alive and being tortured in a Guatemalan 
1. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd, Christopher v. Harbury, 
536 U.S. 403 (2002). 
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interrogation camp.2 Desperate to save her husband's life, Harbury, an 
American citizen, sought the help of the U.S. government to discover 
his whereabouts.3 
At various times, U.S. officials, including the U.S. Ambassador to 
Guatemala and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, reported 
that they were "seriously looking" to obtain information surrounding 
Harbury's husband's whereabouts, that the Guatemalan military 
denied ever having custody of Bamaca, and that they would contact 
Harbury if they received any additional news.4 Only after a 60 Minutes 
investigative report revealed that the State Department had 
intelligence confirming that Bamaca had been captured alive did the 
government confirm its knowledge of his detainment.5 Lake stated, 
however, that he had since "scraped the bottom of the barrel" and had 
obtained no information as to whether Bamaca was still alive.6 After 
more fruitless efforts, Harbury filed a Freedom of Information 
Request only to receive no response.7 Finally, in 1995, she began a 
hunger strike in front of the White House, prompting Congressman 
Robert Toricelli to announce that Bamaca had been killed years 
earlier and that the men responsible for the death were paid Central 
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") informants.8 
Harbury subsequently filed a complaint against the CIA, the State 
Department, the National Security Council ("NSC"), seventeen CIA 
employees, five State Department employees, two NSC employees, 
and various unnamed employees at each of these agencies.9 The 
complaint alleged, inter alia, that through the defendants' affirmative 
acts of deception, the defendants had foreclosed her efforts to seek 
judicial relief and possibly save her husband's life.10 It thereby alleged 
that these acts effectively denied Harbury access to the courts.11 
The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case 
for failure to state a cause of action.12 The court ruled that even if 
2 Id. 
3. Id. She also obtained permission to open what the Guatemalan government had 
marked as Bamaca's grave only to find another man's body. Id. 
4. Id. at 598-99. 
5. Id. at 599. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). 
9. Harbury v. Deutch, No. 96-00438 CKK, 1999 WL 33456919, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 
1999), rev'd, Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d at 609, rev'd, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 
(2002). 
10. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d at 609. 
11. Id. 
12. Harbury v. Deutch, 1999 WL 33456919, at* 8. 
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Harbury's situation implicated an access-to-courts violation, Harbury 
would first need to exhaust her state court remedies to demonstrate 
that her cause of action had in fact been prejudiced. 13 Even then, the 
court found that the officials would be entitled to qualified immunity 
because they had no duty to provide Harbury with information about 
her husband.14 The D.C. Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the 
affirmative acts of the officials, if done for the purpose of suppressing 
a lawsuit, sufficiently stated a case for denial of access to the courts.15 
The court further held that because Harbury could no longer obtain 
the relief that she would have pursued absent the deception - i.e., 
emergency injunctive relief to save her husband's life - requiring her 
to file state court claims when her husband was already dead would 
serve no purpose.16 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed the 
D.C. Circuit's decision. 17 In doing so, however, the Court refused 
explicitly to recognize or reject the validity of Harbury's denial-of­
access claim.18 Instead, it dismissed Harbury's case for failure to state a 
cause of action.19 The Court reasoned that irrespective of the 
constitutional validity of the denial-of-access claim, Harbury's 
particular claim failed because she could not state a valid underlying 
cause of action, i.e., a cause of action that could have been litigated 
had the alleged deception not occurred.20 The Court found untenable 
Harbury's assertion that emergency injunctive relief, had she timely 
known of the government's involvement in her husband's detainment, 
could have saved Bamaca's life.21 In this way, the Court resolved 
Harbury's claim without reaching the substantive question of whether 
a constitutional tort22 actually lies in such a claim.23 
13. Id. at *9-10. 
14. Id. at *10. 
15. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d at 610. 
16. Id. at 609. 
17. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 422 (2002). 
18. Id. at 414 n.9 ("All [previous backward-looking access cases] have been decided in 
the Courts of Appeals, we assume, without deciding, the correctness of the decisions." 
(citations omitted)). 
19. Id. at 422. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 422 n.19 (discussing the difficulty in trying to prevent Bamaca's death by 
enjoining acts of U.S. government officials who are only indirectly involved in his torture). 
Indeed, the possibility that an injunction could have prevented the death of her husband, 
who was under Guatemalan control, is remote. For the sake of simplicity in analyzing the 
access-to-courts issue presented in this case, however, this Note analyzes cases in which prior 
court actions could have been fruitful. 
22. Claims seeking damages for violations of the Constitution are brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 or as Bivens actions, both of which allow for civil actions against state and 
federal officers respectively. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
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This Note addresses the question left unanswered in Harbury: 
whether these denial of access-to-courts cases, which Justice Souter 
termed "backward-looking" access claims,24 are valid exercises of a 
constitutional right. Backward-looking access claims such as Harbury's 
differ from traditional denial of access-to-courts claims in that their 
aim is not to remove impediments to bringing causes of action in the 
future.25 Rather, backward-looking access claims allege that a suit that 
could have been filed in the past was not brought or was not litigated 
effectively, because access to the courts was at that time denied or 
obstructed by government officials.26 These cases look "backward to a 
time when specific litigation ended poorly, or could not have 
commenced, or could have produced a remedy [now] unobtainable."27 
The novelty of these cases lies in the fact that until very recently, the 
right of access to courts had always been conceived as providing only 
forward-looking rather than retrospective relief.28 
More specifically, within this category of cases, this Note seeks to 
answer the following question: If the government intentionally lied to 
you sometime in the past and either prevented you from filing a claim 
or from litigating a claim effectively, can you obtain relief in the 
present for a denial of access to courts?29 And if so, what are the 
contours of such a right? This Note argues that the Supreme Court, as 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). These constitutional 
claims are now generically referred to as "constitutional tort" actions. See generally, 
Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980) [hereinafter Whitman, 
Constitutional Torts]. 
23. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 414 n.9. Some scholars have interpreted the 
Court's opinion in fact to have recognized the cause of action. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, 
Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 729-30 (2003). However, even if 
the opinion could be interpreted thusly, its cursory treatment of the claim as well as its 
finding that backward-looking cases must seek relief "unobtainable in other suits" imply at 
best an exceedingly narrow right. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 416. 
24. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 414. 
28. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. 
29. To clarify, this Note does not address the full range of backward-looking access 
claims, but only those that allege intentional conduct. Litigants could conceivably allege a 
denial of access to courts where negligent action on the part of government officials resulted 
in prejudice to the litigants' claim. See, e.g., Harrell v. Cook, 169 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(alleging loss of cause of action when police negligently misplaced evidence). Although the 
question of whether negligent action also violates the right of access to courts is important , 
courts' and scholars' dichotomous treatment of negligent and intentional conduct renders 
this inquiry beyond the scope of this analysis. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 537-40 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION] 
(discussing the Supreme Court's aversion to finding constitutional violations for negligent 
acts). For the sake of simplicity, this Note uses the term "backward looking" to refer only to 
cases involving intentional conduct. 
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it has done with forward-looking prisoner's cases,30 should carve out a 
body of jurisprudence to allow for denial-of-access-to-courts claims in 
cases where official fraud or conspiracy has thwarted a potential cause 
of action. Resolution of the backward-looking access issue is 
particularly pressing today given current anxiety over the federal 
government's increasing power to regulate national security and the 
relative obscurity in which it is able to do so. 
Part I describes the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on and the jurisprudential gaps in the right of access to courts and 
illustrates the need for greater guidance from the Court specifically 
regarding intentional backward-looking access claims. Part II argues in 
favor of recognizing backward-looking access-to-courts claims by 
examining constitutional tort theory as well as Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on forward-looking access cases. It demonstrates that 
not only do the policies underlying constitutional torts provide 
particularly compelling reasons for allowing backward-looking access 
claims, but also these claims implicate few of the concerns typically 
attendant to constitutional tort litigation. Finally, by analyzing the 
history of the access right as well as lower court opinions governing 
backward-looking claims, Part III offers a workable framework for 
addressing these causes of action, leading courts towards a more 
uniform method of adjudication. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND CURRENT ST A TUS OF T H E  R IGHT OF ACC ES S 
TO COURT S 
The right of access to courts originated in English common law 
and, since its introduction into American common law, has evolved 
into a complex amalgam of legal doctrines and theories that continue 
to evolve today. This Part demonstrates that the access right has 
origins in and has developed through many different constitutional 
clauses, and that courts have treated backward-looking claims 
differently from other types of access-to-courts claims despite the 
apparent similarity between the various types. 
A. A Brief History of the Right 
The right to seek judicial redress for grievances is grounded in 
several different constitutional provisions, including the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth31 and Fourteenth32 Amendments, the Privileges 
30. Although forward-looking cases have involved civil litigants as well as prisoners, the 
Supreme Court has almost exclusively limited its forward-looking jurisprudence to the 
prisoner context. See infra note 61 and accompanying text for a more in-depth explanation. 
31. U. S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be . . .  deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law."). 
December 2004) Government Corruption 559 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV,33 and the First Amendment's 
Petition Clause.34 In some ways, this breadth of origin has afforded the 
right of access to courts a measure of legitimacy insofar as its 
constitutionality is well-established.35 As this Note argues in Part III, 
however, it has also contributed to a great deal of confusion 
surrounding the right's parameters - confusion that has in part 
stymied its doctrinal growth.36 This Section demonstrates that each of 
the above sources provides a legitimate doctrinal framework for the 
access right while at the same time illustrating the potential for 
confusion that such broad grounding can cause. 
One concept to which the right's origins have often been traced is 
due process.37 In English common law, the right of access to courts 
enjoyed its status as one of five fundamental rights designed to protect 
life, liberty, and property,38 the precursors to American due process 
guarantees.39 This grounding carried over into American common law 
and as the right matured, it was afforded certain protections to 
guarantee its free exercise.40 In colonial America, for instance, 
government bodies recognized the right of disenfranchised as well as 
enfranchised groups to petition for redress of grievances.41 In addition, 
all petitioners were highly insulated from retaliation or punishment for 
their petitions.42 The Supreme Court eventually endorsed these 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law."). 
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging . . .  the right of the 
people .. . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."). See Christopher v. 
Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415 n.12, for a summary of the different constitutional sources. 
35. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (describing the right of 
citizens to resort to the courts as one of the most "fundamental" characteristics of society); 
Chambers v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (describing the right of 
access to courts as "one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship"). 
36. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
37. The right of access is grounded in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clauses and undergo similar analysis under each. See, e.g., Christopher v. Harbury, 
536 U.S. at 415 n.12; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 419-20 (1997). 
38. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 137. The other fundamental rights 
were (1) Constitution, powers and privileges of Parliament, (2) limitations on the King's 
prerogatives, (3) a right to petition the King, or either House of Parliament, for redress of 
grievances, and ( 4) a right to have arms for self-defense. Id. at * 136-41. 
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
40. Steven A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the 
Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L .J. 142, 144, 153 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First 
Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different 
Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 22, 31-33 (1993). 
41. Spanbauer, supra note 40, at 31-33. 
42 Id. 
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protections, pronouncing in 1882 that the right of citizens to seek 
redress in the courts would be protected from "arbitrary 
interference."43 The Court reiterated its endorsement nearly a century 
later in Wolff v. McDonnell,44 interpreting the due process right of 
access as one which "assures that no person will be denied the 
opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning 
violations of fundamental constitutional rights." 
In addition to due process, the right of access to courts is also 
properly rooted in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV.45 Although history delineating the reach of this Clause is sparse, its 
general intent was to protect fundamental individual liberties from 
interference by the government.46 In the words of Justice Washington 
in Corfield v. Coryell,47 the Clause protected those interests "which 
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments." One of these 
basic interests was the right to institute actions in court.48 The 
Supreme Court upheld this view of the access right in the seminal case 
of Chambers v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,49 endorsing the primacy 
of the access right by characterizing it as "one of the highest and most 
essential privileges of citizenship."  Today, the Clause's protection of 
the right of access to courts stands undisputed.50 
Lastly, the access right is grounded in the First Amendment's 
Petition Clause, which states that "Congress shall make no law . . .  
abridging . . .  the right of the people . . .  to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances."51 The petition right originated in England 
with the Magna Carta of 1215,52 and afforded citizens the opportunity 
to petition the King, Parliament, and the courts for redress of personal 
43. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882). 
44. 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). 
45. See Chambers v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Blake v. 
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983). 
46. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa 1823) (No. 3,230). 
47. Id. 
48. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1890). 
49. 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (emphasis added). The Court further delineated the right as 
"conservative of all other rights [in organized society], and [lying] at the foundation of 
orderly government." Id. See also Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898); Slaughter­
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). 
50. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002), for a recent case in which 
the Supreme Court recognized that the right of access to courts is rooted in part in the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
52. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the 
First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 597 (1999) [hereinafter Rice 
Andrews, A Right of Access]; Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging . . . ": An 
Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 
1153 (1986); Spanbauer, supra note 40, at 22. 
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as well as social ills.s3 The petition right carried over from England to 
colonial America, initially protecting the right of citizens to petition 
their legislatures for redress of similar concerns,s4 and eventually 
developing to protect filing of judicial complaints.ss Thus, the right to 
petition was an explicit source of protection for seeking adjudication 
of complaints in the courts.s6 In keeping with this history, the Supreme 
Court affirmed in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimiteds1 that the "right of access to the courts is indeed but one 
aspect of the right of petition." 
In short, courts have to date analyzed access-to-courts cases under 
a variety of different constitutional doctrines and have provided little 
guidance as to the ways in which the cause of action might differ under 
each doctrinal source. In neglecting to delineate between these various 
sources, courts have perhaps inadvertently generated confusion as to 
the precise parameters of the right as well as its limits. In the following 
Sections, this Note suggests an alternative framework under which to 
analyze the right of access to courts with the hope of moving toward 
more disciplined and predictable adjudication of these claims.ss 
B. The State of the Access-to-Courts Doctrine 
The principle that an individual has a right "to resort to the laws of 
his country for a remedy"s9 has evolved into the well-settled notion 
that every citizen has a general right to seek judicial redress in the 
courts for his grievances.60 Today, the question is no longer whether 
such a right exists, but rather how far this right extends. Specifically, 
when, if ever, can one seek redress in the courts for interference with 
53. Rice Andrews, A Right of Access, supra note 52, at 597-98. 
54. Id.; James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First 
Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899, 
929-34 (1997). 
55. Higginson notes that around the time of abolition, the legislatures were flooded with 
petitions from abolitionists, prompting intense reluctance on the part of assemblies to 
continue addressing individual petitions. Higginson, supra note 40, at 158-59. Concomitantly, 
the rise of judicial institutions resulted in courts taking over where legislative institutions had 
left off, eventually removing jurisdiction over private petitions from legislative institutions 
altogether. Id. at 157-58. 
56. Pfander, supra note 54, at 960. 
57. 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). See also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 
731, 741 (1983). 
58. See infra Part III.A. 
59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
60. See, e.g., Rice Andrews, A Right of Access, supra note 52, at 563-67; see also 
Chambers v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) ("The right to sue and 
defend in the courts is the alternative of force . . . .  It is one of the highest and most essential 
privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each State to the citizens of all other States 
to the precise extent that it is allowed to its own citizens. "). 
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the very right to seek redress in the courts? Courts have answered this 
question in different ways depending on the type of claim. This 
Section highlights the differences, notwithstanding their similar 
natures, between the judicial treatments of the various access-to­
courts claims. 
Today, access cases fall into three main categories: forward­
looking cases, retaliation cases, and backward-looking cases, with the 
backward-looking category of claims remaining the most highly­
contested of the three. In forward-looking cases, claimants argue that 
certain impediments, such as filing fees, deny them access to the 
courts.61 The Supreme Court has recognized a broad range of 
protections within this first group, especially with regard to prisoners.62 
In a second group of cases, best referred to as "retaliation" cases, 
claimants allege an infringement of their right of access to courts 
because a government actor retaliated against them for filing a claim.63 
For instance, in Harrison v. Springdale Water and Sewer Commission,64 
the plaintiffs claimed a denial of access to the courts when state 
officials filed a frivolous condemnation counterclaim in response to 
the plaintiffs' nuisance suit against the city.65 The Eighth Circuit found 
that the facts as alleged would constitute a violation, recognizing the 
validity of the retaliation claim.66 
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 
(1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). 
62. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-25 (1977), for an overview of these cases. 
Since it first recognized a prisoner's right to file for habeas relief without interference from 
the state in 1941, Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), the Court has struck down regulations 
prohibiting prisoners from assisting each other in legal filings, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 
483 (1969), has required waiver of legal fees for indigent prisoners, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 
252, 257 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956), and has imposed an obligation on 
prison officials to provide adequate law libraries and/or legal assistance to prisoners. 
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-25. 
The Court has also recognized a right of access for civil litigants, albeit a very narrow 
one. In 1971, the Court broke out of the prisoner context to invalidate a statute requiring 
payment of court fees in order for indigents to obtain divorces. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371 (1971). The scope of this access right remains unclear because the Court has not 
since ruled in favor of a civil litigant. For instance, two years after Boddie, in Ortwein v. 
Schwab, the Court curtailed the Boddie rule by rejecting the notion that all state filing fees 
violated the right of access for indigent litigants. 410 U.S. 656, 658-59 (1973). Filing fees 
would only amount to a denial of access if the underlying litigation involved a fundamental 
right and resort to the courts was the only way of vindicating that right. Id. at 658-60. See 
infra notes 177-189 and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of the 
ramifications of the fundamental rights distinction. 
63. See, e.g., Harrison v. Springdale Water and Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 
1986); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976). 
64. 780 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1986). 
65. Id. at 1428. 
66. Id. Similarly, in Silver the Tenth Circuit found a denial of access to courts when a 
public official threatened to withhold certain payments owed to the plaintiff should the 
plaintiff follow through with a lawsuit he had filed against the city. 529 F.2d at 163. The 
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed these retaliation cases. It has ruled generally 
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The third and most unsettled of the access-to-courts claims are the 
backward-looking cases such as Harbury's, where the claimant argues 
that past government action impeded or thwarted a claim or potential 
claim. The theory behind backward-looking cases is that the coverup, 
by preventing disclosure of evidence critical to a suit, denies or 
interferes with the plaintiff's right of access to the courts by preventing 
or undermining litigation of the claim.67 
Backward-looking claims typically arise as a result of police 
misconduct. In Bell v. City of Milwaukee,68 for example, defendant 
police officers shot and killed a man after a routine traffic stop. They 
then planted a knife on him and claimed they acted in self-defense.69 
Twenty years after the family of the victim entered into a paltry 
settlement agreement with the city, the officers confessed to the 
coverup.70 The Seventh Circuit found this conspiracy to have 
effectively denied the family meaningful access to the courts.71 
Denial of access to courts has also been implicated in human 
experimentation cases, where the U.S. government performed 
chemical and other tests on humans without their consent.72 In Barrett 
v. United States, plaintiff family members brought suit after a man died 
from mescaline injections administered to him in a psychiatric facility 
as part of a secret experimental program conducted by the U.S. 
Army.73 The family argued that had they known of the injections, 
which were administered without the patient's consent, they would 
have enjoined the action and thereby prevented the man's death.74 The 
coverup denied them access to the courts because it wholly concealed 
against government retaliation for exercising one's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Mt. 
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282-84 (1977) (finding a 
violation where teacher's contract was not renewed because of teacher's public criticism of 
school policies); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[I]f the government could 
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, 
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited."). At the same 
time, the Court's recent decision in BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002), 
which protected an employer's right to file a retaliatory lawsuit, renders uncertain the 
current state of this doctrine. See Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K· The "Difficult 
Constitutional Question" of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Couns, 39 Hous. 
L. REV. 1299 (2003) for an informative discussion of this case. 
67. See, e.g., Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 969-70 (5th Cir. 1983). 
68. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). 
69. Id. at 1216. 
70. Id. at 1223. 
71. Id. at 1261. 
72. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986); Heinrich ex rel. 
Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D. Mass. 1999); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 
F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
73. See Barrett, 798 F.2d at 567. 
74. Id. 
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information such that it was impossible for them to know they had a 
cause of action to pursue. Similar claims have been brought by victims 
and their families for human radiation experiments carried out by the 
Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.75 The 
Supreme Court has not considered a backward-looking access case 
since Harbury, and thus there has never been a definitive ruling on 
their validity.76 
In sum, despite the early promulgation of the right of access to 
courts, judicial decisions delineating the scope of the right beyond the 
context of the prisoner's cases are sparse and vague. In backward­
looking claims, its most recent incarnation, the right has been used to 
vindicate cases where past actions by government officials are alleged 
to have interfered with a plaintiff's pursuit of a cause of action.77 Due 
to the short history of adjudicating backward-looking claims78 as well 
as the somewhat obscure theory behind them, it is the most ill-defined 
and contentious of the three types.79 
II. IN SUPPORT OF THE VALIDITY OF BACKWARD-LOOKING ACCESS 
CLAIMS 
If litigants are to advocate expanding constitutional torts doctrine 
to include backward-looking access-to-courts cases, they must be 
prepared to defend this expansion in light of the reality that courts 
today are generally loath to recognize new constitutional tort 
violations.80 Because of uncertainty as to how far constitutional tort 
75. Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D. Mass. 1999); In re 
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
76. The author's thorough search yielded no such cases. 
77. E.g., Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). 
78. The first appellate-court case was Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983), 
issued in 1983. 
79. See Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1989) (illustrating the confusion 
surrounding the doctrine: "(w]e cannot say with certainty that there is no possibility that any 
set of facts which might be proved in support of the allegations would entitle the [plaintiffs in 
an earlier case] to some relief.") .  
80. See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 22, at 6-7. By recognizing, in Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), what had until then been a dormant right of plaintiffs to use 
section 1983 to sue state officials for constitutional violations, the Supreme Court created an 
unprecedented means by which victims of past constitutional violations could seek damage 
awards. Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 664-67 (1997) [hereinafter Whitman, Emphasizing] (explaining 
how, before Monroe, the class of litigants able to challenge government action in court was 
limited to those "subject to continuing government control" and not to those who had 
suffered harm in the past); Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and 
Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 617 (1997) (hereinafter Wells, Constitutional 
Torts] ("Before Monroe and the revival of § 1983, there was no point in thinking in 
constitutional terms about an injury that took place in the past and . . .  had no bearing on 
any other legal obligation owed by or to the victim."). The Court recognized a similar right 
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recovery should extend, and in the face of an ever-increasing number 
of lawsuits claiming constitutionally protected injuries, courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, have all but taken the position that 
new constitutional tort claims should be presumptively denied.81 This 
reality, coupled with the Supreme Court's evasive treatment of 
Harbury's claim,82 heightens the possibility that if the Supreme Court 
should ever reach the merits of another backward-looking access 
claim, it would refuse to recognize it as a valid cause of action. 
This pervasive hostility towards constitutional torts, however, is 
unwarranted in backward-looking access-to-courts cases. Section II.A 
argues that the Supreme Court itself has set forth principles for 
adjudicating access-to-courts claims that, when applied to backward­
looking cases, fall in favor of their recognition. Section 11.B 
demonstrates that backward-looking access-to-courts claims, viewed in 
light of contemporary constitutional tort theory, espouse the very 
goals that have driven constitutional tort recovery in other arenas. 
Section llI.C shows that these claims do not trigger the concerns, such 
as fears of overexpansion of constitutional tort litigation and 
overdeterrence of official action, that have occasioned the current 
impulse of courts to restrict recovery in other areas. 
A. Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court to Date 
Supreme Court rulings on the right of access to courts in the 
forward-looking cases provide compelling justifications for extension 
of these same protections to the backward-looking context. In 
forward-looking cases, specifically those involving prisoners, the Court 
has time and again stated that access to the courts must amount to 
to sue federal officers in 1971 in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In the time since, however, courts have struggled with 
constitutional tort claims, straining to find a proper balance between redress for harms 
suffered by victims and unbridled liability for hosts of government actions. See Whitman, 
Emphasizing, supra, at 667-68; Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective 
Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997 (1990); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699 (1976) (dismissing 
allegation that defamation by a state official constituted a§ 1983 claim because such a claim 
would "almost necessarily . . .  result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been 
inflicted by a state official . . .  establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
81. See, e.g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 22, at 6-9; Perry M. Rosen, The 
Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 343-44 (1989). But 
see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (finding a violation under Equal Protection Clause of 
the fundamental right to vote where a state recount failed to secure minimum requirements 
for nonarbitrary treatment of voters). 
82. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002) (requiring backward-looking 
claims to seek a remedy not obtainable through any other cause of action and thereby 
severely restricting the types of claims that might be brought); see also supra note 18. 
566 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:554 
more than a theoretical ability to enter the courthouse doors.83 The 
Court has held that the right must, if it is to have any significance, 
provide practically meaningful access to the courts.84 For instance, in 
Bounds v. Smith,85 a group of prisoners challenged a state's refusal to 
provide adequate law libraries as a de facto deriial of access to courts. 
In finding for the plaintiffs and imposing upon the state an affirmative 
responsibility to provide a better library, the Court promulgated the 
now oft-repeated requirement that access to the courts be "adequate, 
effective, and meaningful" in order to pass constitutional muster.86 The 
right must afford more than the mere ability to file a claim.87 It must 
provide an opportunity for the litigant to present his claims "fairly."88 
These same principles apply with equal force to the backward­
looking cases such as Harbury's. First, despite Justice Souter's 
compartmentalization of backward-looking claims as distinct from 
forward-looking claims, there is nothing particularly novel about the 
former that warrant their separate treatment. American tort law is 
premised upon the notion that a victim may seek compensation for 
injury that has occurred in the past.89 The Court in Monroe, in holding 
police officers liable for an unreasonable search and seizure, extended 
this idea to the constitutional context, creating a means by which 
victims of past constitutional violations could also seek compensation.90 
In the years since Monroe, the courts have applied the Monroe and 
Bivens rulings to hold government actors liable for a variety of past 
constitutional infringements.91 Thus, although the idea of permitting 
recovery for harm inflicted in the past is new as applied to the doctrine 
of access to courts, the idea itself is not novel either in common law 
tort or constitutional tort. 
Second, application of these principles to cases such as Harbury's 
demonstrates that refusal to impose liability in the backward-looking 
context creates the very inequities that the Supreme Court 
endeavored to avoid in its forward-looking access-to-courts 
83. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-25 (1977) for a summary of cases. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 818. 
86. Id. at 822. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 823 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974)). 
89. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FuNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 1 (2d ed. 
2002). 
90. 365 U.S. at 171-72. See supra note 79. 
91. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Gamer, 471U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force during arrest); Jeanty 
v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d U19 (7th Cir. 1974) (denial of housing opportunities); 
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) (unlawful arrests). 
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jurisprudence. For instance, in Bell v. City of Milwaukee,92 Bell's 
family, not knowing the true circumstances of Bell's death, agreed to a 
paltry wrongful death settlement with the city for $1,800. Undeniably, 
the officers' conspiracy to cover up the crime for twenty years denied 
the Bell family any semblance of an adequate and meaningful 
adjudication of its claim.93 In this way, when government actors abuse 
their ability to monopolize information by covering up evidence of 
their negligence, they deny effective court access to those wishing to 
pursue recovery for injuries stemming from the negligence.94 Whether 
a plaintiff is impaired in her ability to bring a claim because a city 
refuses to waive filing fees or because city officials knowingly provide 
her with false information, the end result is the same. The claimant, 
through state-created impediments, has been deprived of her right to 
receive a fair opportunity to be heard in court.95 
In fact, backward-looking access claims present a stronger claim 
for recognition than the already accepted forward-looking cases. In 
the backward-looking context, government actors are only called upon 
not to take active steps to thwart a litigant's claim.96 In comparison, 
forward-looking cases require action on the part of the official through 
provision of libraries, counsel, and other assistance.97 It follows that if 
officials have a duty under some circumstances to assist litigants 
proactively in accessing the courts, a fortiori they must, at a minimum, 
92. 746 F.2d 1205, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs, in the end, never signed the settlement 
agreement and refused to accept the money. Id. 
93. When the Bells relitigated their claim in 1983, the jury returned a verdict of over 
$300,000 for injuries stemming from the killing. Id. at 1225. 
94. In Nielson v. Clayton, for example, state hospital personnel killed a man by 
performing a chokehold on him but classified his death at various times as "unknown" 
and/or a "heart attack." Nos. 94-1620, 94-1765, 94-1766, 1995 WL 417569, at *1-2 (7th Cir. 
July 11, 1995). Although in this case the coverup ultimately failed, had these officials 
succeeded in effecting their plan, they would no doubt have impeded the family's attempts 
to recover for wrongful death. See also Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 427 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1994); Saul B. 
Shapiro, Note, Citizen Trust and Government Coverup: Refining the Doctrine of Fraudulent 
Concealment, 95 YALE L.J. 1477, 1487-91 (1986) (discussing how the government's 
monopoly on information and its resulting ability to keep information secret exacerbates the 
possibility of abuse). 
95. To be sure, this analysis does not presume that states may never prevent litigants 
from filing suit. For instance, sovereign immunity precludes certain claims against state 
governments and the federal government. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra 
note 29, at 589; Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 
1203 (2001). This Note does not argue that sovereign immunity should be abolished, but only 
argues that if a litigant has an apparent right to pursue a particular cause of action, a state 
official may not take steps to deny that right. 
96. Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of 
Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201, 229 (1984). 
97. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 
(1969); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). 
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refrain from doing anything to impede a claim.98 Thus, when 
government officials take affirmative steps to thwart a potential 
wrongful death claim by passing it off as a suicide,99 or destroy 
evidence necessary to prove a cause of action, 100 there is a particularly 
compelling argument for providing relief. 
B. Backward-Looking Claims and the Constitutional Torts Paradigm 
Looking beyond the scope of the access-to-courts doctrine, 
constitutional tort theory generally also favors recognition of 
backward-looking access-to-courts claims. The principal reason courts 
have carved out a separate sphere of liability to remedy constitutional 
wrongs is that these violations, as opposed to common law violations, 
inflict a special type of injury upon their victims, an injury not present 
in common law torts.101 One can point to the Los Angeles Police 
Department's Rampart corruption scandal,102 the accusations of 
racially-motivated brutality leveled against the New York Police 
Department,103 and even the scandals of the Watergate era104 to 
demonstrate the devastating ramifications that government 
conspiracies and abuses of power can cause. The social harm and 
98. Indeed, the conflicting holdings of the district court and the D.C. Circuit stem in part 
from differences in their perceptions of the defendants' actions. The district court denied 
Harbury's claim because it read her claim to allege a duty on the part of government officials 
to investigate her claim. Harbury v. Deutch, No. 96-00438 CKK, 1999 WL 33456919, at *10 
(D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1999), rev'd, Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd, 
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). The D.C. Circuit, however, reframed her 
complaint as alleging a duty not actively to provide false information in hopes of thwarting 
her ability to seek redress in the courts. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 609 (D.C. Cir. 
2000), rev'd, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). In doing so, it found a prima facie 
showing of a violation. Id. Had the district court read correctly Harbury's allegation, it may 
have ruled differently. See Harbury v. Deutch, 1999 WL 33456919, at *10 (implying that, had 
Harbury alleged an affirmative suppression or destruction of evidence, her claim may have 
stated a valid cause of action). 
99. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983). 
100. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 427 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994). 
101. Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 80, at 669. 
102. See Matt Lait and Scott Glover, The Rampart Scandal; LAPD Probe Fades Into 
Oblivion; The Investigation That Gripped the City Is All But Over, Though Far from Done, 
L.A. DMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 2426596 (discussing the two-year 
probe of the Rampart-area police department following reports of widespread criminal 
activity by Rampart police officers). 
103. See Human Rights Watch, Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and 
Accountability in the United States (1999), at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm 
(discussing numerous incidents of unjustified shootings, beatings, and other abuses by New 
York City police that took place during the mid- to late-1990s). 
104. See generally KEITH W. OLSON, WATERGATE: THE PRESIDENTIAL SCANDAL 
THAT SHOOK AMERICA (2003) (detailing the use of Republican funds to finance widespread 
and illegal intelligence gathering by the Nixon administration that lead to Nixon's 
resignation in 1974). 
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mistrust such abuses engender can be debilitating, and one can 
intuitively sense that the damage these scandals leave in their wake is 
qualitatively different than when only private actors are involved.105 
The distinct nature of this harm stems from the unusual nature of 
citizen-government interaction.106 As articulated by professors Michael 
Wells and Thomas Eaton, citizens place a certain degree of trust in 
their government bodies and actors to implement rules and 
regulations, to provide services, create order, mete out justice, and in 
general to safeguard societal interests.107 This trust is compelled in part 
by the government's monopoly on police power and rule-creation, 
which creates an unavoidable dependency of the public upon it.108 The 
resulting power imbalance creates a citizenry particularly vulnerable 
to government coercion.109 In all, these factors align to give 
government officials a unique ability not only to harm but to harm a 
greater number of people with greater ramifications.110 
Not only is the potential to harm in the context of government 
actors greater than in the realm of private law, but also the harm is 
itself unique in that these abuses inflict a "moral" injury that is not 
similarly implicated outside of the context of government action.111 
This injury is propagated by the unusual role the state plays in 
affording legitimacy to a person's membership in society.112 Professors 
Dauenhauer and Wells point out that to the extent citizens rely upon 
the state to create a properly functioning and ordered society, the 
state must also rely on the citizens to engage themselves as 
105. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 96, at 229-30; Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 80, 
at 669. 
106. Wells & Eaton, supra note 96, at 229. 
107. Id.; Shapiro, supra note 94, at 1488. 
108. Shapiro, supra note 94,. at 1487-91 (arguing that people tend to place a great deal 
of trust in government actors because of the inherent need to rely on government for basic 
goods, services, and information, among other things). 
109. Id. at 1488. 
110. For instance, because of the federal government's monopoly on information, it was 
able to conceal from the public the fact that it was conducting nuclear testing in Nevada 
between 1951 and 1963. See Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). The 
nuclear tests ultimately resulted in over a thousand residents developing leukemia and other 
cancers. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF 1HE 
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 96TH CONG. 2D SESS., "THE 
FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS:" A REPORT ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF LOW-LEVEL 
RADIATION SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING PROGRAM 
CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 22 (Comm. Print 1980). 
111. As Professors Bernard Dauenhauer and Michael Wells explain, injury caused by 
infringements on constitutional rights cannot necessarily be quantified in monetary terms. 
Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective Justice and Constitutional Torts, 35 
GA. L. REV. 903, 911-16 (2001). The real concern that constitutional torts address is the 
"moral" injury suffered by victims of these violations and also the social harm engendered 
by the abuse. Id. See also Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 80, at 669. 
112. Dauenhauer & Wells, supra note 111, at 911-16. 
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contributing members of society - in essence, to conform to the rules 
the state has created.113 Because of the inherent vulnerability of each 
participant to the whims of the government, every violation 
committed against him by the state in effect delegitimates his 
membership in society, risks alienating his ongoing participation, and 
upsets the symbiotic balance of rights and obligations between the 
two.114 Awarding victims redress through constitutional tort actions 
serves to offset the damage the government wrongdoer may have 
caused.115 It accords the victim a renewed sense of legitimacy and 
encourages him to remain a productive member of the community.116 
Imposing liability for constitutional violations also promotes social 
peace by urging people to continue to "embrace their citizenship."117 
In addition, liability for these abuses does more than provide 
redress for the individual claimant. A constitutional violation affects 
more than any individual victim: "A constitutional tort committed 
against one citizen can, and not infrequently does, give other citizens 
reason to fear that they too may become the direct victims of some 
deprivation of due recognition."1 18 Accordingly, government 
accountability for the violation serves to ameliorate the fear and 
disillusionment aroused in those sympathetic to the victim as well.119 
113. Id. at 913-15. 
114. Id. at 916. The community as a whole must take steps to ensure that the 
"empowering function" of the state prevails over its "dominating, disempowering function" 
if it is to prevent a collapse of social order. Id. at 915. Along these same lines, Wells and 
Eaton also argue that courts should limit constitutional torts to cases that implicate a threat 
to concern and respect for the individual by the government, since this is the interest that the 
Constitution intended to protect. Wells & Eaton, supra note 96, at 232. 
The theoretical focus on government's unique power to demoralize can also account for 
the allowance of nominal damages in constitutional tort actions. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U.S. 247 (1978) (awarding nominal damages where plaintiffs demonstrated a violation of 
their constitutional rights even if they suffered no other harm). As Professor Whitman points 
out, the allowance of nominal damages, which is not allowed for common law torts, is rooted 
in the idea that constitutional torts are in part meant to address the dignitary harm caused by 
government abuse of power. Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 80, at 669. 
115. Dauenhauer & Wells, supra note 111, at 917. In the same way that government 
regulations of property can involve demoralization costs, constitutional violations can also 
result in demoralization. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). See 
also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 790 
n.126, 807-08, 809 n.188, discussing the ways in which Fifth Amendment takings claims are 
analogous to Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claims, and Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123 (1996), applying 
the demoralization concept to Fourth Amendment actions, for other areas to which the 
concept of demoralization has been applied. 
116. Dauenhauer & Wells, supra note 111, at 917. 
117. Id. at 920. 
118. Id. at 918. 
119. Id. 
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Claims that involve intentional attempts on the part of a 
government actor to defraud a victim or conceal information implicate 
precisely those harms that constitutional torts are intended to address, 
perhaps more than any other type of constitutional claim.120 As 
scholars and courts uniformly recognize, harms inflicted upon victims 
through deliberate, intentional action tend to produce more 
deleterious results than injuries that result from simple negligence or 
ignorance.121 While both types of acts might lead to similar 
quantifiable losses, injuries inflicted intentionally or maliciously carry 
the added demoralization that does not usually result from negligent 
actions.122 And even those scholars who advocate greater limitations 
on constitutional tort recovery do not advocate limiting recovery in 
cases of intentional and flagrant abuse.123 
In the case of backward-looking access claims, in fact, the injuries 
suffered by victims are twofold: the injury inflicted by the underlying 
cause of harm and the injury caused by the ensuing coverup. For 
example, in Barrett v. United States there were actually two separate 
sources of injury inflicted upon Mr. Blauer and his family.124 The first 
came from the nonconsensual use of Mr. Blauer by the government 
for human experimentation and his resulting death.125 The second 
came from the active and extensive coverup of the experimentation 
program by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.126 Both acts implicate 
120. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986); Bell v. City of 
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983); 
see also supra note 29. 
121. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 278 
(2000) [hereinafter Jeffries, Disaggregating]; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in 
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90-91 (1999) [hereinafter Jeffries, Right-Remedy]; 
Wells & Eaton, supra note 96, at 246-50; Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 80, at 690-91. 
122. Wells & Eaton, supra note 96, at 248. 
123. Jeffries, Right-Remedy, supra note 121, at 90-91. Professor Jeffries goes so far as to 
suggest that constitutional tort doctrine be altered to include only constitutional violations 
involving malicious motivation. Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 121, at 278; see also 
Wells & Eaton, supra note 96, at 241-52; Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 80, at 690-91. 
Indeed, Professors Wells and Eaton also argue that constitutional torts should be available 
where the defendants acted intentionally, recklessly, or in disproportion to the benefits 
conferred by legitimate goals of the state. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 96, at 236-37. 
Courts as well have never been concerned about imposing liability in cases involving 
blatant abuse, perceiving no danger in imposing liability on this type of conduct because it so 
clearly violates the most "basic" constitutional norms. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of 
Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 845, 850-53 (2001). 
124. 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986) 
125. Id. at 567. 
126. In their efforts to keep the mescaline injection program secret, the federal 
government, including the Department of Justice and the Chemical Corps, attempted to 
keep secret the contract between the Army and the psychiatric hospital. Id. at 568-69. The 
officials also decided to attribute the injection program to the Army Medical Corps instead 
of the Chemical Corps should they be required to divulge sponsorship of the program. Id. 
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those compensable injuries, e.g., physical injury, emotional and mental 
suffering, generally addressed by common law torts.127 The coverup 
triggers the additional moral disenfranchisement that scholars agree 
constitutional torts are intended to protect against.128 Because of the 
unique type of harm inflicted in these backward-looking access claims, 
such claims tend to better reflect the policies of constitutional liability 
than other, more controversial, constitutional claims.129 This analysis 
holds true for all backward-looking access cases involving intentional 
acts, such as Ryland, Bell, and Harbury, because all involve an original 
cause of action as well as injury caused by the intentional concealment 
of information pertaining to that original claim. 
C. Absence of Concerns Limiting Recovery 
At the same time, backward-looking access-to-courts cases do not 
raise those concerns and criticisms that have in the past defeated so 
many constitutional claims. One of the principal reasons courts have 
refused to recognize new constitutional torts is the fear of 
overexpansion, i.e., the fear of opening the floodgates for increasingly 
novel and vague claims of constitutional wrongdoingY0 Lurking 
beneath this worry is the broader concern that as courts give greater 
allowance for more constitutional tort recovery, such torts will become 
virtually indistinguishable from common law torts and will lose any 
special "constitutional" status they were meant to have.131 Then­
Justice Rehnquist articulated this fear in Paul v. Davis: 
If the same [allegedly defamatory] allegations had been made about [the 
plaintiff] by a private individual, he would have nothing more than a 
claim for defamation under state law. But, he contends, since 
[defendants] are . . .  [officials] of city and of county government, his 
127. ABRAHAM, supra note 89, at 207-08. 
128. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the 
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 93-95 (1989); Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 
80, at 669. 
129. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (declining to find liability where 
negligence resulted in the attack of a prisoner by another inmate); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693 (1976) (dismissing a section 1983 claim alleging defamation at hands of police officer). 
130. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) 
(refusing to impose an affirmative duty on social workers to prevent child abuse); Davidson 
v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (declining to find 
liability where negligence resulted in prison slip and fall). This fear of overlitigation is 
understandable, and given that the number of civil rights filings in the two decades after 
Monroe increased from under 300 to over 30,000, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, 
The Reality of Constitutional Ton Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 662 (1987), few 
scholars question the need for at least some limiting devices to prevent such proliferation. 
See generally Wells, Constitutional Torts, supra note 80; Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra 
note 22; Rosen, supra note 81. 
131. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 698-99; Whitman, Emphasizing, supra note 80, at 670. 
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action is thereby transmuted into one for deprivation by the State of 
rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of 
reasoning. Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to 
result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by 
a state official acting under "color of law" establishing a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.132 
This concern, however, does not adequately justify denial of 
backward-looking access claims, because these claims do not fall 
within the category of cases to which the fear is directed. Rehnquist's 
concern in Paul v. Davis was that constitutional torts were being 
construed by litigants as nothing more than common law torts 
involving government officials, when they were originally intended to 
provide more distinctive protections. 133 He seemed to suggest that 
courts should entertain only those constitutional tort actions that 
involve abuses committed by government qua government.134 Thus, 
constitutional recovery should be reserved for those abuses that 
government actors are able to commit precisely because they are 
government actors.135 
Backward-looking access-to-courts claims involve exactly such 
scenarios. Government bodies and their agents are armed with the 
power to provide protections for the public by enacting and enforcing 
laws and investigating infractions.136 This very power, carrying with it a 
special ability to monopolize information and impede information 
dissemination, also carries with it a special susceptibility for abuse, 
which affords government officials the opportunity to effect their 
conspiracies. 137 Because of this nexus, there is little worry that 
recognition of backward-looking access-to-courts cases might relegate 
constitutional torts to nothing more than a "font of tort law" in the 
way that allowing recovery for defamation by a police officer or a slip 
and fall on government property might. 138 
Nor do these access-to-justice claims implicate the other oft­
repeated criticism of constitutional tort law: detrimental 
132. Paul, 424 U.S. at 698-99. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 710-711 (construing its earlier cases to imply that constitutional torts will only 
be found where a state arbitrarily removes or infringes upon a right it had previously granted 
in its capacity as a state). 
135. Id. 
136. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
138. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 701 and supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text for a 
further explanation of Paul's concerns. 
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overdeterrence.139 Constitutional torts, like common law torts, strive to 
deter activities that may lead to injury.140 More than common law torts, 
however, they carry the heightened concern that imposing liability on 
government actors might inhibit not only detrimental conduct but also 
beneficial conduct.141 The fear is that if liability flows too easily from 
infringements of the Constitution, government actors, who do not 
personally realize the benefits of their activities, will become overly 
risk-averse, shying away from acting in those gray areas that might 
subject them to suit.142 
These concerns, however, apply exclusively to liability imposed for 
negligent conduct rather than intentional conduct.143 As one scholar 
aptly noted, there is no disagreement among courts or scholars as to 
whether cases of intentional wrongdoing and/or malice should trigger 
liability: 
[although r]easonable people may differ over where to draw the line . . .  
the basic idea here is this: we seek to identify police conduct that may be 
socially useful and, even if that conduct is (non-egregiously) 
unconstitutional, we accord it immunity from suit. At the same time, we 
identify conduct that we are not worried about overdeterring - conduct 
that is lacking in social utility, or shocking and egregious - and we label 
it "over-the-line" and expose it to liability.144 
Backward-looking access claims do not give rise to these concerns 
because they deal only with deliberate, knowing efforts to cover up 
harmful activity. The backward-looking claims addressed in this 
analysis do not seek to impose liability for merely accidental or 
negligent behavior, but only where the specific goal of the government 
actor was to thwart litigation that the plaintiff otherwise had a right to 
pursue. There is little if any social utility in this type of conduct.145 
139. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL 
WRONGS 71-73 (1983). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. Jeffries, Right-Remedy, supra note 121, at 90; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh 
Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 877-78 (2000). 
1 42. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1792 (1991). Stemming from this worry is 
the additional possibility that such a liability scheme will deter competent people from 
serving in government. Id. at 1750 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)). 
Liability imposed for too many acts will deter socially desirable "vigorous decisionmaking" 
by government officials and result in a less than optimal assemblage of public servants. Id. 
See also SCHUCK, supra note 139, at 21-22. 
143. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 142, at 1792. 
144. Gilles, supra note 123, at 853. 
145. See id. at 851 ("[W)here courts are confronted with actions that they apprehend as 
egregious and largely devoid of social utility, e.g., . . .  corruption . . .  courts perceive no 
danger of overdeterring vigorous, legitimate police activity, because the challenged action is, 
by definition, one which any reasonable officer will clearly understand to violate the most 
basic constitutional norms."). 
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There is no fear that imposing liability in these cases will produce the 
loss-creating behavioral deterrence that drives so much of the courts' 
wariness. 146 
In sum, backward-looking access claims are prototypical of claims 
that the courts envisioned when they first began to use the 
Constitution as a vehicle for recovery and espouse the very principles 
that drive imposition of liability on government actors. There are few 
distinguishing factors to justify excluding recovery for backward­
looking claims and allowing recovery for forward-looking ones, or 
recognizing some constitutional torts but not backward-looking access 
claims. 
III. A METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK FOR ADJUDICATING 
BACKWARD-LOOKING ACCESS CLAIMS 
While it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will 
recognize backward-looking access claims as viable causes of action, 
almost all of the appellate courts that have addressed the issue agree 
that such a cause of action exists.147 In keeping with the Supreme 
Court's ambivalence regarding the issue, however, these courts' 
decisions conflict sharply on virtually every critical element governing 
146. Indeed, the Supreme Court endorsed this view in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 
n.11 (1978) (sanctioning punitive damage awards where government agents acted "with a 
malicious intention to deprive [plaintiffs) of their rights or to do them other injury"). See also 
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 142, at 1793-94 (arguing that when the conduct in question is 
clearly prohibited, "to withhold remedies because of cost or disruption would threaten the 
maintenance of an appropriate structure of incentives to learn and comply with 
constitutional rules. By contrast, when officials reasonably might have thought their conduct 
constitutionally valid, there is less need to impose a 'penalty' to deter future misconduct."); 
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of 
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 102 (1997). 
147. The Fifth Circuit was the first to rule decisively on the issue in Ryland v. Shapiro, 
708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983), finding a denial of access to courts where a local prosecutor 
used his authority to coverup a murder to look like a suicide. Id. at 973. The Seventh Circuit 
followed suit a year later in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). To date, 
in addition to the Fifth and the Seventh Circuits, the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh, 
and D.C. Circuits have affirmatively recognized the validity of backward-looking access 
claims. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219 
(9th Cir. 1998); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986); McKay v. Hammock, 
730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984). To note, because the D.C. Circuit's Harbury decision was 
reversed by the Supreme Court, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002), this circuit's 
position on the issue remains unclear. 
The Third Circuit, in Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991), and the 
Sixth Circuit, in Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997), 
recognized in dicta the holdings of Bell and Ryland, but have not yet upheld a violation of 
the right. The First Circuit also recognized Bell in Williams v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 430, 
435 (1st Cir. 1986), but declined to rule explicitly on the issue and has never affirmed the 
right. To note, although the First Circuit upheld a denial-of-access claim in Germany v. 
Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 15-18 (1st Cir. 1989), the plaintiff in Germany was a juvenile in state 
custody, rendering the case more like a prisoner's access case rather than a true backward­
looking access case. 
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it. Consequently, while most appellate courts have recognized the 
right, they have failed to articulate a coherent framework for analysis 
of such a right. Moreover, as these courts have continued to narrow 
their jurisprudence over time, the future of litigation under this cause 
of action has become increasingly uncertain.148 This Part offers a 
methodology for analyzing backward-looking access claims, and by 
delineating the sources of conflict among the lower courts, proffers a 
workable framework for future adjudication of them. 
A. A Method for Understanding the Right of Access to Courts 
One of the main problems propagating the ongoing confusion in 
the appellate courts is the very breadth of the access right, the 
diversity in the right's constitutional origins having led courts down 
wildly different paths and having caused many courts to retreat 
doctrinally in the face of growing uncertainty.149 To remedy this 
problem, courts must find a way to define the right more narrowly and 
delineate a more precise blueprint for addressing these claims. To this 
end, courts should cease adjudicating backward-looking access claims 
under vague notions of "fundamental rights" or the generic rubric of 
due process.150 Instead, courts should frame the right in the 
constitutional provision where it is most specifically addressed: the 
First Amendment's Petition Clause.151 As the Supreme Court has 
articulated in the past, where there is a specific constitutional right 
infringed, using due process to adjudicate claims can be redundant.152 
148. Even those courts that have accepted the cause of action as constitutionally valid 
have engaged in significant judicial backpedaling over the years, increasingly narrowing its 
scope and rendering uncertain its future viability. For instance, although when the Fifth 
Circuit first recognized the cause of action in Ryland it adopted a very broad view of right, in 
cases since the court has severely narrowed this decision. It has done so by imposing narrow 
intent requirements on the cause of action, Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1989), 
requiring a showing of "substantial prejudice" to the original claim as opposed to mere 
interference, and disallowing claims brought for post-filing abuses, Foster v. City of Lake 
Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1994). 
Other courts have followed suit, imposing overly stringent requirements of proof, 
Nielsen v. Clayton, 62 F.3d 1419 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that a hospital examiner's report 
that patient died of a heart attack following a chokehold despite evidence of neck trauma 
and blood on the deceased's nostrils was not sufficient evidence of coverup), complicated 
ripeness doctrines, Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1 151, 1 152-54 (9th Cir. 2000), 
and use of equitable exemptions such as equitable tolling and spoliation of evidence lawsuits 
to preempt denial-of-access claims, Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 1 19 F.3d 1259, 1265 (6th 
Cir. 1997). 
149. See sources cited supra note 148. 
150. See, e.g., Bell, 746 F.2d at 1261; Ryland, 708 F.2d at 971. 
151. U.S. CONST., amend I. 
152. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), a plaintiff sued various police officers 
for using excessive force during his arrest in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights. Id. at 388-90. The Supreme Court refused to consider the claim under the 
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In explaining this idea, the Court has stated that courts may not look 
to more generalized rights to adjudicate claims that already receive 
protection under a specific textual source.153 Applying this lex specialis 
principle to the context of backward-looking access claims, courts 
should look not to vague constitutional sources such as the Due 
Process or Privileges and Immunities Clauses to frame the access-to­
courts doctrine, but should instead examine the history and purposes 
of the Petition Clause to define the basic parameters of the right, even 
if the right may be secondarily informed by due process principles.154 
B. Toward a Uniform Framework for Adjudicating Claims 
This Section, by applying the principles governing the right to 
petition as well as those constitutional tort policies referenced in Part 
II, suggests a more precise framework for analyzing backward-looking 
access claims, setting forth the basic contours of the right so as to 
guide courts' future decisionmaking. While this Section does not 
purport to define every parameter of the claim, it offers specific 
solutions to some of the more divisive problems surrounding the cause 
of action. 
1. How Far Should the Right Extend? 
One area of divergence concerns what stage or stages of access the 
right protects. The appellate courts disagree as to whether the right 
only applies to pre-filing abuses or whether it also extends to post­
filing abuses. For instance, in Smith v. Marasco,155 the Third Circuit 
refused to recognize a violation when police officers who were sued 
for wrongful death destroyed incriminating audiocassette tapes in 
response to a discovery request.156 The court interpreted the right of 
access to courts as applying only to pre-filing abuses, and consequently 
Fourteenth Amendment, ruling instead that the claim should have been brought as a Fourth 
Amendment "unreasonable seizure" claim. Id. at 394-95. 
The Court has since applied this principle to a variety of other cases involving the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998); Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994). Similar analysis has also driven the Court's Fifth 
Amendment takings jurisprudence. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197-99 (1985); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). 
153. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
154. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated 
Suits, Rule 11, and the First Amendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1 (2001). See generally Rice 
Andrews, A Right of Access, supra note 52 (arguing that the right of access to courts should 
be adjudicated under the First Amendment). See also Pfander, supra note 54, at 899, for the 
view that the First Amendment's Petition Clause was intended to allow citizens to sue the 
government for unlawful conduct. 
155. 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003). 
156. Id. at 512. 
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found that the cause of action did not apply because the cover-up 
occurred after litigation had already commenced.157 The courts that 
restrict the backward-looking access right to abuses that take place 
pre-filing reason that if the deceit occurs post-filing, the litigant has 
already brought suit, which means her ability to access the courts has 
not been infringed upon.158 They further opine that when a litigant is 
already in court, the judicial system can provide appropriate redress 
for any abuses that take place, thus obviating the need for a denial of 
justice claim.159 
Other courts, however, have never imposed this temporal 
restriction. To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit in Bell refused to 
make any distinction between the instances of coverup that occurred 
before a claim was brought and those that occurred after, finding that 
even those abuses that took place during the course of litigation 
contributed in denying the Bells adequate access to the courts.160 The 
court stated that even though the original claim had been litigated to 
completion, the denial-of-access claim was nonetheless valid because 
the conspiracy had "rendered hollow" the right to seek redress.161 
In keeping with the Seventh Circuit's instincts on this issue, 
examination of the petition right's historical practice indeed 
demonstrates that the right to petition does not encompass merely the 
right to submit a claim. As noted by Professor Stephen Higginson, the 
petition right in early America included not only the right to file a 
claim, but also the right to receive a fair hearing as well as a 
response.162 No petition could be summarily dismissed without abiding 
157. Id. at 511-12. The Fifth Circuit in Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425 (5th 
Cir. 1994), also adopted this interpretation, denying a similar claim in which plaintiffs alleged 
that police destruction of evidence during discovery violated their right of access to courts. 
Id. at 430. 
158. See Marasco, 318 F.3d at 511-12; Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 
1263 (6th Cir. 1997). 
159. Id. 
160. 746 F.2d 1205, 1263 n.72 (7th Cir. 1984). 
161. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1261. The Second Circuit in Barrett v. United States also allowed a 
denial-of-access claim to proceed even though the underlying claim had been fully litigated 
and had resulted in a settlement. Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 577-78 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
162. Higginson, supra note 40, at 155. In its early manifestations, the right to petition 
was interpreted literally and encompassed little more than the actual right to submit a claim. 
Spanbauer, supra note 40, at 26. When the petition right carried over from England to 
colonial America, however, the inequities of a practice where governing bodies could 
summarily discard a petitioner's claim became apparent as governing institutions became 
more accountable to the citizenry than those in England. Higginson, supra note 40, at 155 
(stating that colonists' "outrage" over England's refusal to listen to their grievances led the 
Framers to include a governmental duty to a fair hearing). As such, in contrast to its English 
predecessor, the original right to petition in America developed to include a right to a fair 
hearing and a response, thus affording some procedural guarantees to petitioning activity. 
Id. at 147-49; Spanbauer, supra note 40, at 33-34. 
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by at least these procedures, and the right to full judicial consideration 
came to be one of the "inviolate" principles governing the right to 
petition in America.163 
In addition, even in its early manifestations, petitioners could rely 
on more than simply these basic procedural protections. In England as 
well as in America, petitioning activity was also insulated by law from 
interference and retaliation by government officials. The English Bill 
of Rights of 1689, for instance, strictly prohibited governmental 
intrusions and also guaranteed the right's "free[ dom] from 
governmental retaliation. "164 These same protections carried over to 
colonial America, and as the right developed here, interference with 
petitioning activity by government officials soon came to result in 
citizen challenges.165 Eventually, the Framers of the Constitution 
included the petition right in the Bill of Rights as one of several 
enumerated "fundamental" rights of citizens upon which the 
government could not infringe absent a compelling interest.166 
In viewing these principles together with the historical scope of the 
petitioning right, it becomes clear that those protections that 
guarantee the right's freedom from government interference must 
properly be seen as extending to the entire course of litigation. If 
petitioning activity was protected against arbitrary government 
interference, and if petitioning activity historically included the right 
to a fair hearing as well as to a response, it follows that the entire 
process, rather than simply the filing of the claim, must be insulated 
from government intervention. To this end, analysis of backward­
looking denial-of-access claims must include those conspiracies that 
take place after a claim has already been filed as well as those that 
occurred before the claim was brought. 
This interpretation is also consistent with current jurisprudence 
governing the right of access to courts. The Supreme Court has made 
clear in the past that a mere "formal" right of access will not suffice to 
satisfy the right.167 It has unequivocally expressed the view that 
163. Higginson, supra note 40, at 149. 
164. Spanbauer, supra note 40, at 26. Spanbauer does clarify that although freedom 
from retaliation was upheld in theory, until the early eighteenth century petitions were often 
stymied and in some extreme cases, those offensive to the King resulted in the petitioner's 
imprisonment. Id. Nonetheless, it is critical to note that, in theory, punishment was not 
condoned and was eventually prohibited altogether. Id. 
165. Smith, supra note 52, at 1 172-73. See also RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR 
INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY VIRGINIA 36-
41 (1979). 
166. See Rice Andrews, A Right of Access, supra note 52, at 590-621 and Pfander, supra 
note 54, at 900 for a thorough discussion of how the drafting history of the Petition Clause 
supports the notion that the right was not meant to apply only to petitioning the legislatures 
but also to petitioning the courts. 
167. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (concluding that a filing-fee 
requirement to obtain a divorce effectively foreclosed court access for indigents). 
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"[a]ccess to courts does not only protect one's right to physically enter 
the courthouse halls, but also insures that the access to courts will be 
'adequate, effective and meaningful."'168 Other courts have also 
observed that although the right "in its most formal manifestation 
protects a person's right to physically access the court system . . .  
[w]ithout more . . .  such an important right would ring hollow in the 
halls of justice."169 Accordingly, protections for the access right must 
be shaped to provide an opportunity for the litigant to present his 
claims "fairly" and not simply to submit his papers to the courthouse 
clerk.170 As the Sixth Circuit has aptly noted, to impose a merely 
formalistic interpretation of the right would entirely defeat its 
purpose.171 
Enforcing the Petition Clause protections in this way makes 
normative sense as well. To cite one example, in Foster v. City of Lake 
Jackson, the plaintiffs alleged that a malfunctioning traffic light led to 
their son's death in an auto accident.172 They were, however, unable to 
press their claim effectively when police destroyed records logging 
complaints about the light and further purported to know nothing 
about the light's malfunction.173 The court dismissed the denial-of­
access claim on the ground that it was improperly brought for post­
filing abuses, which fell outside the scope of the right.174 In this 
situation, however, given that the evidence necessary to support the 
plaintiffs' case was intentionally kept hidden from them, one cannot 
sensibly argue that the plaintiffs' right to present their claims fairly 
was not impeded just because the abuse happened after they filed 
168. Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997). 
169. Id. 
170. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823. 
171. Swekel, 119 F.3d at 1262 ("[T]o what avail would it be to arm a person with such a 
constitutional right, when the courtroom door can be hermetically sealed by a functionary 
who destroys the evidence crucial to his case."). The Supreme Court may, for instance, adopt 
the "breathing space" doctrine for Petition Clause cases borrowing from its jurisprudence 
governing free speech. Although in its strictest sense, false defamatory speech is not 
protected by the First Amendment, see ABRAHAM, supra note 89, at 253, the Supreme 
Court recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that strict 
adherence to the doctrine would vitiate free speech protections because erroneous 
statements are "inevitable" in the course of free debate. Id. at 271-72. In response, the Court 
adopted the "breathing space" doctrine, which essentially creates a buffer zone around the 
First Amendment privilege and immunizes it from liability. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) .  In the same way, the Court might apply this doctrine to grant 
protections for more than just the act of petitioning but for the subsequent litigation 
activities that make petitioning meaningful. The Court has in fact recognized the relevance 
of the "breathing space" doctrine to Petition Clause cases in BE & K Construction Co. v. 
NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 530-31 (2002), but it has yet to promulgate this particular rule. 
172. 28 F.3d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 1994). 
173. Foster, 28 F.3d at 427. 
174. Id. at 430 & n.7. 
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their lawsuit.175 Nor is it normatively reasonable to argue that 
conspiracies covering up the facts of a crime are somehow more 
worthy of protection or somehow more harmful if they occur before a 
claim is filed rather than after.176 The dispositive inquiry should be 
simply whether the deliberate actions in fact interfered with the 
disposition of the claim.177 
2. What Types of Claims Are Protected? 
A second area of uncertainty plaguing the appellate courts 
involves the types of underlying claims the backward-looking right of 
access to courts protects. Some courts have construed the right 
broadly and have applied it to protect any and all suits. The Second 
Circuit, for example, has stated that the right protects all property 
rights, including any "vested right[s] of action."178 Under this broad 
construction, the constitutional inquiry is straightforward: 
" [u ]nconstitutional deprivation of a cause of action occurs when 
government officials thwart vindication of a claim."179 
Other courts, however, have suggested that the right only protects 
vindication of "fundamental rights. "180 In Ryland, for instance, the 
Fifth Circuit grounded the access right in the Due Process Clause, and 
in so doing seemed to insinuate that the Clause protects only the 
opportunity to seek redress for violations of "fundamental 
constitutional rights."181 And although no court to date has imposed 
this limitation expressly, this dictum in Ryland coupled with similar 
175. In Foster, the plaintiffs alleged that the destruction of log records, police refusal to 
respond to interrogatories, and false deposition testimony so impeded their ability to gather 
evidence that they were forced to settle for a much smaller sum of money than originally 
sought. Id. at 427 n.4. 
176. Presumably the Foster court based its decision on the availability of Rule 1 1  
sanctions (and its state analogues) t o  remedy post-filing abuses. See, e.g., LaBarbera v. 
Angel, 95 F. Supp. 2d 656, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Imagining, however, a situation where the 
discovery abuses went undetected until long after the litigation ended highlights the 
sophistry in arguing that pre-filing abuses violate the right while post-filing abuses do not. 
177. See, e.g. , Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1983). 
178. Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 1986). 
179. Id. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in Harrell v. Cook agreed to hear an appeal where 
the plaintiffs alleged that police mishandling of evidence thwarted their ability to recover 
money stolen from them by a third party. 169 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1999). The court 
ultimately dismissed the claim, but in an important clarification of the access right, stated 
that had the plaintiffs alleged that the police intentionally misplaced or destroyed the 
evidence, the claim would have survived. Id. at 432-33. 
180. Ryland, 708 F.2d at 972. 
181. Id. 
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such intimations made by the Supreme Court182 forebode that it may 
be a ground for future restriction of the backward-looking access right. 
Analysis of Petition Clause history as well as analysis of current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence governing the right, however, 
demonstrates that the right of access to courts protects more than 
simply fundamental rights. In its inception, the right to petition itself 
was deemed one of only a handful of "fundamental rights,183 and in 
colonial America this right was not restricted to protect only a narrow 
class of essential rights but was used to vindicate a broad range of 
private interests, fundamental or not.184 Whether petitioning to resolve 
debt actions, estate distributions, divorce proceedings, or land 
disputes, all were protected exercises of the right.185 
Moreover, the First Amendment under which petitioning activity 
receives its protection has never been construed to protect only 
fundamental liberty interests. Specifically with regard to the Petition 
Clause, the Supreme Court has never construed the right to apply only 
to fundamental liberties. In Bill Johnson 's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 
for instance, the Court held that suits filed by an employer against a 
union for unfair labor practices were protected from NLRB sanctions 
even if the suits were filed for retaliatory purposes. 186 In finding for the 
employer, the Court held the right of access to courts "too important" 
to be prohibited as an unfair labor practice, even though the 
petitioning activity sought only assertion of economic interests.187 In 
the years since Bill Johnson's, the Court has consistently upheld 
similarly broad protections for petitioning activity,188 prohibiting 
interference with petitioning seeking vindication of a variety of 
economic interests as well as fundamental rights.189 
In short, restricting backward-looking access claims to only those 
cases where the original cause of action concerned a fundamental right 
would fly in the face of well-established principles governing the First 
Amendment and petitioning. Although the remedy provided might 
182. In Ortwein v. Schwab, the Supreme Court ruled that refusal to waive filing fees to 
appeal a welfare-hearing determination was not a basis for a denial-of-access claim because 
the interest affected, increased welfare payments, was not sufficiently "constitutionally 
significant." 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973). 
183. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
184. Higginson, supra note 40, at 158-59. See also Pfander, supra note 54, at 940. 
185. Higginson, supra note 40, at 146. 
186. 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). 
187. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 741. 
188. The Court reiterated this view more recently in BE & K Construction Co. v. 
NLRB, which also involved an employer's allegedly retaliatory legal filings. 536 U.S. 516, 
531-34 (2002). 
189. See, e.g., id.; Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (recognizing 
union's right under petition Clause to assist its members in litigation). 
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vary based on the relative importance of the original claim,190 these 
considerations should not bear on the actual validity of the claim itself. 
3. Must the Underlying Claim Have Been Litigated? 
A third, and perhaps the most contested, source of disagreement 
among the appellate courts is whether the claimant must have 
attempted to litigate the underlying cause of action before pursuing a 
denial-of-access claim.191 The Sixth Circuit imposed this requirement 
in Swekel v. City of River Rouge,192 finding that only by having litigated 
or attempted to litigate the original claim would a plaintiff be able to 
demonstrate that access to the courts was actually denied.193 The court 
held that such a determination would be impossible to make if the 
underlying claim was never brought before the courts to begin with.194 
It further cautioned that "[a] plaintiff cannot merely guess that a state 
court remedy will be ineffective because of defendant's actions."195 
Other circuits, on the other hand, have declined to impose this 
litigation requirement. For instance, the Seventh Circuit in Bell held 
inequitable any requirement forcing plaintiffs to demonstrate what 
relief they "would have obtained" had the conspiracy never occurred, 
finding that coverups inherently preclude knowing what "would have 
happened" absent the conspiracy.196 Instead, the court required only a 
showing that the concealment was a "substantial cause of their failure 
to obtain judicial relief."197 In doing so, the court implied that the 
190. For instance, conspiracies covering up wrongful deaths might warrant a stronger 
remedy than conspiracies covering up loss of personal property. 
191. See Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1998); Swekel v. City of 
River Rouge, 1 19 F.3d 1259, 1264 (6th Cir. 1997) (imposing this requirement). Compare with 
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 609 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 
U.S. 403 (2002) (finding this requirement unnecessary). 
192. 1 19 F.3d at 1264. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 1263-65. 
195. Id. at 1264. The Swekel court did allow for the possibility that, in some cases, any 
attempt to bring suit would be "completely futile," implying that the prerequisite could be 
waived under such circumstances. Id. But see infra notes 205-222 and accompanying text for 
an explanation of why this exception does not resolve the problems with this requirement. 
The Ninth Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit in imposing this requirement, Delew v. 
Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998); Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151 (9th 
Cir. 2000), holding as well that only after litigation of the underlying issue has concluded can 
a litigant realistically demonstrate injury sufficient to allege a constitutional violation. 
Morales, 214 F.3d at 1 154; Delew, 143 F.3d at 1222-23. 
196. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1263 (7th Cir. 1984). 
197. Id. at 1263 n.72. 
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constitutional violation would remain viable irrespective of whether 
the underlying claim could be restored and litigated.198 
Indeed, as the Bell court suggests, there are several critical 
problems with the litigation requirement that weigh in favor of its 
abandonment.199 First, to the extent that it requires plaintiffs to have 
filed or attempted to file their claims when their causes of action first 
became ripe, the requirement does not take into consideration those 
cases such as Harbury, Ryland, or Barrett where the conspiracy 
entirely prevented the · plaintiffs from bringing their claims because it 
covered up the claim's existence.200 In Harbury, for instance, Jennifer 
Harbury alleged that because federal officials so extensively covered 
up their involvement with her husband's captors, she had no idea that 
suing to enjoin their activities might save her husband's life.201 In other 
words, the coverup was so sophisticated that she did not know she had 
a claim to pursue until it was too late and the claim was no longer 
viable.202 In Harbury and similar cases, the litigation requirement 
effectively penalizes the plaintiffs for the success of the conspiracy. 
198. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Ryland also declined to impose the litigation requirement, 
adjudicating the plaintiffs' case without even inquiring into whether a state claim might still 
be brought. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 973 (5th Cir. 1983). In doing so, the court 
rejected the notion that an ability to institute or reinstitute the original suit would obviate 
the denial-of-access claim, finding that a constitutional deprivation could occur from delay 
alone, even in the absence of prejudice to the underlying cause of action. Id. at 975-76. 
199. The Supreme Court has made clear in past cases that section 1983 does not require 
exhaustion of state or even administrative remedies before filing a claim. See 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 29, at 466-69. This section argues that 
even if courts were to ignore these pronouncements, exhaustion in backward-looking access 
cases would still be unjustified. 
200. In Ryland, the family of the deceased did not pursue a wrongful death claim 
because the coverup of the murder led them to believe that she had committed suicide. 708 
F.2d at 969-70. Similarly, in Barrett the plaintiffs had no idea that the U.S. Army Chemical 
Corps was really behind the mescaline injections administered at the New York State 
Psychiatric Institute and therefore could not pursue a claim against it. Barrett v. United 
States, 798 F.2d 565, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1986). 
201. Brief for Respondent at 7-8, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) (No. 01-
394). Recognizing this flaw, the D.C. Circuit refused to uphold the district court's 
requirement that Harbury attempt to file suit before pursuing an access-to-courts claim. 
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 609 (2000), rev'd, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 
(2002) (stating that such a requirement would be unreasonable in situations where a plaintiff 
had "no reason to believe that she could state a claim in United States courts"). 
202. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d at 609. At this point it is also worthwhile to put to rest 
one source of confusion that tends to muddle the litigation requirement. The Supreme 
Court, in denying Harbury's claim, pointed out that even though a wrongful death claim 
would not bring back her husband's life, neither would the access-to-justice claim. 
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 421-22. It thus enunciated its position that, where a 
denial-of-justice claim would not afford a remedy that other suits could not give, the claim 
would necessarily fail. Id. Other courts have held similarly, finding untenable a denial of 
justice claim where state remedies are still available for the underlying cause of action. See, 
e.g., Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1998); Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 
119 F.3d 1259, 1263-64 (6th Cir. 1997). The fallacy in this argument lies in the failure to grasp 
the distinct nature of the two causes of action. If the fraud has indeed succeeded in 
prejudicing the claim, the plaintiff has a viable denial-of-justice claim along with potential 
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Relatedly, the requirement also produces inequitable results for 
those plaintiffs who, despite having had suspicion of the government's 
wrongdoing, decided not to file their claims because they lacked 
sufficient evidence to prove them.203 If crucial information is kept 
completely hidden or is lost or destroyed, a plaintiff or potential 
plaintiff may simply assume it does not exist and abandon her claim.204 
Imposing the requirement in this case produces similar inequitable 
results. 
Second, to the extent that plaintiffs are expected to litigate their 
claims after the conspiracy has been uncovered, the courts 
misconstrue how constitutional torts function and how backward­
looking denial-of-access claims should be analyzed. In imposing the 
requirement in this scenario, the courts assume that if the original 
cause of action can now be pursued without encumbrance, access to 
the courts has not been denied.205 In doing so, however, the courts 
seem to throw by the wayside some very basic liability rules,206 in that 
they fail to recognize that once a coverup has interfered with the 
claimant's underlying cause of action, a breach has occurred. The 
state claims for the underlying cause of action. See generally Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 
F.2d 1205, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1984) (allowing recovery for wrongful death following discovery 
of the abuses and also for denial of access to courts). 
The discontinuity in the Supreme Court's reasoning here is clear, for if the Bells were 
prevented from pursuing their denial-of-access claim simply because they could still pursue a 
wrongful death suit in state court, there would be no vindication of the injuries inflicted by 
the conspiracy at all - i.e., the Bell's would recover as if the conspiracy had never happened 
and the offending police officers would also go unpunished. Although the ends of corrective 
justice might be satisfied, but see notes 211-213 and accompanying text for an explanation of 
why they might not be, the equally powerful policy goal of deterrence is not. Given that 
constitutional torts are in large part propagated by a desire to deter government officials 
from unconstitutional behavior, SCHUCK, supra note 139, at 16, this above scenario finds no 
justification in law or policy. 
203. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 1994). 
204. The Supreme Court has expressed a similar concern in another arena as well. In 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985), Justice Blackmun stated that a 
prosecutor's failure to respond to a specific request for information during discovery could 
prejudice the defense not simply by depriving it of potentially important information, but by 
"representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist . . .  [such that] the defense 
might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial strategies." 
205. Swekel, 119 F.3d at 1263-64. 
206. While it is beyond the scope of this Note to detail the myriad requirements 
plaintiffs must overcome in bringing section 1983 or Bivens actions, it suffices to say that the 
basic notions of duty, breach, causation, and damages of common law torts also apply to 
constitutional tort actions. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) 
(denying a section 1983 claim because government official did not have duty to prevent child 
abuse); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (finding negligence insufficient to 
support a claim of a constitutional breach); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) 
(holding that a plaintiff in section 1983 litigation must prove "actual injury" in order to claim 
compensatory damages). 
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question at this point should become solely one of damages to be 
proved as a matter of fact.207 
To illustrate by analogy, few would argue that a landlord's post­
hoc agreement to lease an apartment to someone whose application 
was denied in violation of Title VIII would have the effect of 
eviscerating the federal cause of action.208 Nor would an order to 
reinstate an employee who was discriminatorily fired have the effect 
of preempting recovery for damages.209 In both of these scenarios, the 
initial denial of rights in itself results in compensable injury to the 
victim in the form of dignitary, emotional, and mental harm,210 and 
later granting the apartment or reinstating employment does not serve 
to ameliorate these injuries.211 
Similarly, in backward-looking access-to-courts claims, once the 
violation has occurred, the only remaining inquiry should be what 
injuries resulted from the breach. To this end, plaintiffs in 
constitutional tort actions may seek damages for all "actual injuries" 
stemming from the violation, such injuries including emotional and 
mental suffering as well as humiliation.212 Thus, injuries in denial-of­
access claims involve not only prejudice to the original cause of action 
but any emotional and other harms that the plaintiff suffered as a 
result of the breach itself, including demoralization costs caused by the 
deceit as well as humiliation or reputational injury engendered by the 
fraud.213 Many of these injuries, particularly humiliation and loss of 
reputation, take place at the time of the actual violation and not 
simply when it is clear the original claim has been irretrievably 
harmed.214 
Thus, it is inappropriate to look only at the prejudice to the 
underlying claim to determine if the plaintiff has stated a valid cause 
207. See, e.g., Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 976 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing calculation 
of damages once breach has been established). 
208. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LmGATION, § 
25:3, at 25-12 & 25-13, § 25:16, at 25-77 & 25-78 (2003) .  
209. MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 291 (4th 
ed. 1999). See, e.g., Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d. Cir. 1989) 
(allowing recovery for pain and suffering even after the employee was reinstated). 
210. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986). 
211. See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71,  101 (1984). 
212. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 29, at 560. 
213. For example, in the case of Bell, the suggestion that Daniel Bell may have attacked 
police officers with a knife could very well have damaged his and his family's reputation. The 
same is true in Ryland, where the allegation that Lavonna Ryland committed suicide could 
have tarnished her and her family's reputation and caused grave emotional suffering for her 
family. 
214. See supra note 213. 
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of action.215 Whether facts emerge one year or twenty years after an 
injury originally occurred so as to clear the way for the underlying 
claim is an inquiry independent of whether the cause of action was 
undermined at the time the coverup initially took place. Later 
litigation of the original cause of action does not serve to eviscerate 
the constitutional one.216 As Professor Martin Redish rightly observed, 
because section 1983 is directed toward the conduct of persons acting 
under color of state law, the subsequent conduct of the state offering 
remedies to the victim is entirely irrelevant.217 To the extent that 
litigation of the underlying claim is needed, it is only necessary to help 
determine the extent of total damages.218 But where there is a 
believable allegation of emotional and mental injury, recovery is 
warranted even if the underlying cause of action can be restored and 
later litigated.219 
Moreover, because a litigant may receive nominal damages as well 
as punitive damages even in those cases where he cannot demonstrate 
compensable injuries,220 when courts look only to the underlying cause 
215. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating a clear 
case of constitutional injury even though the coverup was eventually uncovered and the 
wrongful death suit was successfully litigated). 
216. See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on 
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) 
("[C]onstitutional violation is complete at the moment the action or deprivation occurs, 
rather than at the time the state fails to provide requisite procedural safeguards surrounding 
the action."); see also Redish, supra note 211, at 101. 
217. Redish, supra note 211, at 102 
218. Litigating the underlying claim can be helpful to the court to determine how 
severely the claim was prejudiced and thereby better assess the damages to be awarded. The 
litigation requirement's purpose here, however, would be solely to assess injury in the access 
claim and not to determine the claim's validity. Where the claim can in fact be litigated 
without any encumbrance, the proper course of action is not to dismiss the denial-of-access 
claim, but to limit recovery to emotional and mental suffering and punitive and/or nominal 
damages. See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text; infra notes 219-221 and 
accompanying text. 
219. It may be that a litigant can recover for these other injuries through the underlying 
cause of action. For instance, the plaintiff may be able to sue for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and recover not only for the emotional distress caused by the initial injury 
itself but also the ensuing coverup. See, e.g., Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 421 
(2002) (stating that nothing prevented Harbury from bringing a suit for IIED in the present). 
The problem with this solution is that even if the plaintiff makes out a clear claim for 
emotional harm, the plaintiff would need to overcome state laws governing immunity for 
official action, laws which vary widely from state to state. PETER G. BROWN, PERSONAL 
LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, AND COMPENSATION FOR LOSS 7 
(Acad. for Contemporary Problems, Law and Ethics Series No. 1, 1977) ("Complete absence 
of legislation . . .  for assessing and assigning liability . . . .  makes it difficult for either citizens 
or officials to know where they stand with respect to redress of grievances and liabilities."). 
Relying on such an unpredictable system for vindicating the egregious abuses implicated in 
these backward-looking access cases ignores the unique circumstances of these claims and 
the importance of constitutional torts. 
220. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (allowing punitive damages where the 
official's conduct was "motivated by evil motive or intent"); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 
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of action to determine the validity of a denial-of-access claim, they 
ignore the general societal interest in punishing and deterring 
egregious behavior221 and in vindicating dignitary injuries that the 
Supreme Court has held section 1983 litigation is meant to further.222 
They also unfairly foreclose relief for these other interests to which 
the litigant is otherwise entitled. For these reasons, because the 
prejudice to the underlying cause of action is not the dispositive 
inquiry in determining whether a plaintiff can recovery for a denial of 
access to the courts, courts should, in keeping with prevailing 
constitutional tort doctrine, abandon the litigation requirement when 
adjudicating backward-looking access-to-courts claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court sidestepped the backward-looking 
access-to-courts issue in Harbury, the increasing divergence of and 
confusion within the lower courts suggests that the Court will again be 
presented with this issue before long. As this Note has demonstrated, 
the potential for official abuse is highest precisely when government 
power is at its peak and its actions, if left unchecked, could result in an 
inability of citizens to vindicate those rights they have an entitlement 
to pursue. 
This Note has demonstrated that, should the Court grant certiorari 
to another backward-looking access-to-courts claim, it should 
recognize the right as a constitutionally valid cause of action. Not only 
does such recognition comport with the access-to-courts jurisprudence 
the Court has set forth to date, but it is also compelled by those 
theories and principles that drive constitutional tort recovery. More 
importantly, this Note has also suggested that should the Court award 
such recognition in a future backward-looking access-to-courts claim, 
it should offer clear guidance to the lower courts on how to adjudicate 
the cause of action. To this end, it should shy away from the current 
restrictive impulse of the lower courts and instead adjudicate claims 
according to the Petition Clause-based framework set forth herein. In 
doing so, the Court would facilitate greater uniformity in the 
development of the right and would also frame the right in keeping 
with history, constitutional tort policies, as well as empirical 
practicality. 
266 (1978) (allowing nominal damages in absence of proof of actual injury). Awarding 
punitive damages furthers the general societal interest in punishing and deterring egregious 
behavior, see for example Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983), while allowing nominal 
damages affords some redress for the moral injury the violation itself may have caused. 
Dauenhauer & Wells, supra note 1 10, at 926 
221. Wade, 461 U.S. at 56. 
222. See supra notes 211-220 and accompanying text. 
